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Systemically Significant Prices
Robert C. Hockett* and Saule T. Omarova†
ABSTRACT
Some prices and indices in domestic or global markets take on particular market-wide
importance. This can occur either because (i) they are associated with ubiquitous in-
puts to production, (ii) they are associated with highly popular asset classes, (iii) by
convention they tend to be used as benchmarks in determining other prices, or (iv)
some combination of the above. Examples include prevailing wage and salary rates,
certain energy and commodity prices, and such indices and borrowing rates as the
Standard & Poor’s 500, the Federal Funds Rate, and the Libor and Euribor interbank
lending rate benchmarks.
We call such prices and indices ‘systemically important’ prices and indices, or
‘SIPIs’. Over the long term, these prices and indices tend towards certain statistical
mean values that reﬂect determinants that can plausibly be treated as ‘fundamentals’,
be these demographic, technological, or global-quantity-rooted in character. At times,
however, SIPIs can move out of alignment with mean values and associated fundamen-
tals owing to distortions stemming from missing information, recursive collective
action problems (including ‘noise’ trading and ‘herd’ behaviour), or even deliberately
manipulative behaviour on the part of inﬂuential or colluding market actors.
We develop a general account of systemically important prices and indices as well
as of the market vulnerabilities to which they can give rise. We then develop a menu of
regulatory strategies for addressing these vulnerabilities in manners that protect mar-
kets’ capacities to translate fundamental values into (more) accurate prices or indices
when such prices or indices are systemically important. Key to the effort is recognizing
that what we propose is in some cases what regulators are committed to doing already
in maintaining market integrity, and in other cases is what central banks do already in
determining appropriate money rental (‘interest‘) rates and securing them through
open market operations.
INTRODUCTION
Since the crisis of 2007–09, it has become something of a commonplace that finan-
cial markets are more than mere sums of their institutional parts.1 It has thus likewise
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become commonplace that updated, macroprudential forms of market regulation
must now complement the more traditional, firm-focused microprudential forms of
regulation that prevailed before the crisis broke out.2 The ‘systemic stability’ of our
financial markets, in other words, is now recognized to be irreducible to the mere
‘safety and soundness’ of banks and other financial institutions, while old forms of fi-
nancial regulation are thus recognized as being in need of supplementation, even
though not simple supplanting, by newer, systemically focused forms.3
Our regulatory regime’s newfound appreciation of systemic significance is re-
flected not only much in post-crisis research and scholarship offered by academics,
central bank researchers, and others, but also in post-crisis legislation and regulation.
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the US, for
example, explicitly recognizes that some financial firms and market utilities are pos-
sessed of systemic significance, and so establishes a regime of ‘enhanced prudential
regulation’ to which certain ‘systemically important’ firms and utilities are to be sub-
jected.4 Much bickering and dickering in New York and Washington accordingly
now concerns whether this or that firm or utility really ought to be designated sys-
temically important, and in consequence saddled with the putative burdens of en-
hanced regulation.5
This article takes claims of the need for enhanced prudential regulation of system-
ically important firms and utilities at face value, but suggests there is at least one
other systemically significant variable that is in need of special treatment. These are
what we call ‘systemically important prices and indices,’ or ‘SIPIs.’ For a number of
reasons that we shall elaborate, SIPIs render financial markets vulnerable to many of
the same systemic dangers as do ‘SIFIs’ (systemically important financial institu-
tions)—and then some. They accordingly call out for enhanced regulatory treatment
just as do SIFIs and systemically important market utilities. In some cases they might
even call out for more—more even than efforts now underway in some jurisdictions
to deal with manipulation, perhaps the most salient of the multiple vulnerabilities to
which SIPIs give rise.6
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub L 111–203, H.R. 4173,
Titles I and VIII (signed into law 21 July 2010).
5 See, e.g., Katherine Chiglinsky et al., Court Hears Metlife’s Challenge to ‘Too Big To Fail’ Designation
This Week, Insurance Journal (Feb. 9, 2016), available at <http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
national/2016/02/09/398082.htm> accessed 24 February 2016.
6 These are important efforts along one dimension of the several that we discuss in the comprehensive
framework that we develop in this Article. Concern over manipulation pervades recent EU efforts to regu-
late benchmarks. See document links at European Commission, New Measures to Restore Confidence in
Benchmarks Following LIBOR and EURIBOR Scandals, 18 September 2013 <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-13-841_en.htm?locale¼en> accessed 24 February 2016. It also prompted the British
Bankers Association to yield oversight of LIBOR to Britain’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), now the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). See Carla Main, ‘Libor Spurned, Credit Scores, German Audit:
Compliance’ Bloomberg Business (26 September 2012) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-
09-26/libor-spurned-credit-score-review-germany-s-audit-compliance> accessed 24 February 2016. It has
also prompted the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to recommend far-reaching reforms to the processes
pursuant to which certain foreign exchange and interest rate benchmarks are constructed. See eg FSB,
Foreign Exchange Benchmarks: Final Report, 30 September 2014; FSB, Reforming Major Interest Rate
Benchmarks, 22 July 2014; and FSB, Progress in Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks: Interim Report on
2  Journal of Financial Regulation
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Our plan of attack is as follows. The section ‘Designation Criteria’ first elaborates
what we believe to render some prices and indices systemically significant, hence
what we believe make up for appropriate criteria in designating some prices or indi-
ces as SIPIs. We emphasize in particular (i) the ubiquity in production of that to
which a price or index pertains, (ii) the ubiquity of investment in certain asset classes
to which a price or index pertains, and (iii) the ubiquity of use of the price or index
in question as a ‘benchmark’ in other pricing decisions. Each of these criteria and any
combination thereof, we suggest, can render some prices or indices more systemi-
cally significant—and hence regulatorily salient—than others. Each also is consistent,
we believe, with the criteria that Dodd–Frank elaborates as germane to the designa-
tion of certain financial institutions and market utilities as SIFIs.
The section ‘Systemic Vulnerabilities’ turns to elaborating the systemic vulnerabil-
ities to which SIPIs can subject our financial markets. We track these by reference to
specific characteristics of the processes pursuant to which the prices or indices in
question are generated. In some cases these processes involve (i) informational ad-
vantages or, relatedly, (ii) conflicts of interest, disproportionate market power, or
manipulative collusion opportunities available to certain ‘large’ or ‘clubby’ market
participants.7 In other cases, the price- or index-determination processes in question
involve (iii) recursive collective action problems that afflict decentralized market
behaviour, depriving the markets in question of stable equilibria. Understanding the
specific vulnerabilities to which SIPIs subject markets by reference to the mechanics
of specific prices’ or indices’ determinations is critical, we argue, to the task of fram-
ing effective regulatory responses to SIPI-associated market risks.
The section ‘Enhanced Regulation’ turns to regulatory strategy. Here we elaborate
five broad, mutually complementary options available to regulators aiming to miti-
gate or modulate the risks to which SIPIs expose our financial markets. All but one
of these options is keyed to a particular dynamic of price- or index-determination.
The first and most generally applicable option is enhanced surveillance, pursuant to
which regulators pay special attention to the prices or indices in question and their
modes of determination in order to ascertain whether and when regulatory interven-
tions are called for. The second option, responsive to asymmetric information, con-
flicted interest, and associated manipulation or collusion opportunities, is licensure
or pre-approval of the index or benchmark in question, with a view to ensuring that
the arbitrage and rent-extraction opportunities that it presents do not outweigh the
putative benefits that it offers. The third option, likewise responsive to asymmetric
information, conflicted interest and collusion, and also to individual firms’ market
power, is enhanced utility-style regulation—including in some cases participation by
regulators in the very ‘clubs’ or coalitions that aggregate and publish benchmark
Implementation of July 2014 FSB Recommendations, 9 July 2015 <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/up
loads/OSSG-interest-rate-benchmarks-progress-report-July-2015.pdf> accessed 24 February 2016. For a
helpful summary of counterpart efforts in Asia, see Australian Securities & Investments Commission,
Financial Benchmarks, Report 440, July 2015 <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/3285136/rep440-pub
lished-8-july-2015.pdf?_ga¼1.46780900.273950129.1454539772.> accessed 24 February 2016.
7 Especially participants who effectively determine and publicize, sometimes with public blessing, the prices
or indices in question.
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prices or indices. The fourth option, responsive more particularly to market power
and potential collusion, is enhanced antitrust and anti-fraud regulation. Finally, the
fifth option, responsive to the recursive collective action problems that beset some
decentralized markets, is price maintenance—typically within some variably narrow-
or broad band—through open market operations (OMO).
In both the ‘Systemic Vulnerabilities’ and ‘Enhanced Regulation’ sections, we aim
to retain coherence with the SIFI and Title VIII market utility regimes established by
Dodd–Frank for prices and indices over which the US has primary jurisdiction, and
coherence with the global financial-regulatory architecture for prices and indices over
which the US lacks primary jurisdiction. Thus, we take the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) to be the appropriate ‘decider’ where domestic SIPI des-
ignation is concerned, then take the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) and at least one
appropriate ‘functional’ regulator—eg the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for certain securities prices, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for fuel oils and en-
ergy derivatives, etc—to be the appropriate developers of particular enhanced pru-
dential standards for particular SIPIs over which the US has primary jurisdiction. By
the same token, we take international bodies such as the FSB, relevant European
Union (EU) institutions, or other domestic regulators such as Britain’s FCA to be
the appropriate designators and standards developers for SIPIs over which the US
lacks primary jurisdiction.
After discussing the transnational implications of our observations and tentative
recommendations, we conclude. Before proceeding, we emphasize that this explora-
tory article does not purport to offer a fully elaborated and adoption-ready blueprint
for regulatory action. We are well aware of the many challenges that will face any
serious effort to institute a comprehensive regime covering all systemically important
prices and indices used in contemporary financial markets. As noted above, more-
over, there are already significant efforts underway in some jurisdictions, aimed at
dealing with at least one SIPI-related vulnerability - manipulation. We do not aim
here to critique or fundamentally shape these ongoing efforts. Our goal is both
broader in scope and more conceptual in character: it is to identify SIPIs as a distinct
subject for academic and regulatory attention, and to develop a general framework
for analyzing their unique importance and policy implications.
DESIGNATION CRITERIA
We begin with the fundamental question of what it is that renders a particular price
‘special’ and accordingly worthy of particular attention. Not all prices or indices need
to bear systemic significance from a regulatory or public policy point of view. But
some undeniably do. It seems to us there are three primary pathways to systemic sig-
nificance. Each of them, moreover, is reminiscent of one or another criterion pre-
scribed by Dodd–Frank as having some bearing upon the systemic significance or
otherwise of particular financial institutions and utilities. We characterize these path-
ways by reference to the systemic significance of the underlying value with which any
particular price or index is associated.
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Ubiquity of the underlying value as a productive input
One obvious pathway to systemic significance is the ubiquity of the item with which
a particular price or index of prices is associated in the production of goods or provi-
sion of services in the ‘real’ economy. Prevailing money rental—ie ‘interest’—rates
are a conspicuous case in point. Where borrowing is an essential mode of financing a
business and its productive activities, and where even other modes of finance—eg
equity issuance—involve costs to the firm that are determined partly by reference to
returns on debt instruments, interest rates represent pervasive economy-wide input
costs. They accordingly affect the prices of multiple goods and services additional to
financing costs themselves. In fact, they affect so many such additional prices that
they critically affect consumer price inflation as measured by the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), not to mention housing and other asset prices.8
The pervasive price-level significance of borrowing costs is precisely why central
banks in developed economies work directly to determine interest rates, or at any
rate to contain them within narrow bands.9 In effect, the OMOs of central banks
worldwide reflect broad recognition of the systemic significance of money rental
prices.10 There are other productive inputs, however, that are nearly or just as ubiq-
uitous as credit. Hence, there are other prices that are arguably nearly or just as sys-
temically significant as interest rates. Energy—and the fuels used to generate it—is
one obvious case in point.11 Labour is another.12 Certain foodstuffs, metals, and
other natural resources count too, though here the degree of systemic significance
will of course vary from resource to resource as a function of inter-substitutabilities
in production.
It is in part precisely in virtue of their ubiquity in production that some have pro-
posed variations on OMO to modulate prices in markets for these productive inputs
much as is already done to modulate prices in markets for money rental. Thus
Keynes, for example, proposed a global commodity store to purchase and sell critical
commodities on world markets in order to maintain price stability with respect to
the same.13 And thus others have proposed ‘employer of last resort’ (ELR) pro-
grammes to keep wages and salaries within stable bands, while also of course
8 Home prices are widely observed to be particularly sensitive to interest rates. See eg Plamen Iossifov and
others, ‘Interest Rate Elasticity of Residential Housing Prices’ (2008) IMF Research Paper 08/247
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08247.pdf> accessed 24 February 2016. That in
turn means that the now widely used Case–Shiller index of housing prices will itself be sensitive to inter-
est rates. See S&P/Case–Shiller Home Price Indices <http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/
sp-case-shiller> accessed 24 February 2016. For more on the CPI and how it is determined, see Bureau
of Labour Statistics, Consumer Price Index <http://www.bls.gov/cpi/> accessed 24 February 2016.
9 See eg Eduardo Levy Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger, ‘Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies’ in Kenneth
Arrow and Michael Intriligator (eds), Handbook of Development Economics (North Holland, 2010).
10 ibid. See also Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary
Policy Strategy, 24 January 2012 <http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_
LongerRunGoals.pdf> accessed 24 February 2016.
11 See eg Ben S Bernanke and others, ‘Systematic Monetary Policy and the Effects of Oil Price Shocks’ (1997) 1
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1997.
12 See eg JM Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (The Choice of Units 1936) ch 4.
13 See eg JM Keynes, ‘The Policy of Government Storage of Foodstuffs and Raw Materials’ (1938) 48 Econ J
449; JM Keynes, ‘The Objective of International Price Stability’ (1943) 53 Econ J 185; JM Keynes, ‘The
International Control of Raw Materials’ (1974) 7 J Intl Econ 299.
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maintaining full employment.14 And thus has the US in the past made occasional use
of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to push down fuel prices during periods of
unusually rapid, speculation-induced rises.15 In all of these cases, prices are effectively
recognized as bearing systemic significance, and are accordingly acted upon with a
view to protecting certain system values—eg those of price stability and, also in
some cases, substantively ‘reasonable’ prices.
Ubiquity of the underlying value as an investment asset
The popularity of a particular value as an investment vehicle is another factor that
can lend prices associated with that value’s systemic significance. The reasons are not
difficult to appreciate. For one thing, if the asset in question is itself traded on finan-
cial markets, its ubiquity as an investment vehicle is virtually by definition significant
to the financial markets. For another thing, if the asset is not itself traded on the fi-
nancial markets, but is so important a part of people’s nonfinancial wealth that it
tends to affect both their financial behaviour and other behaviours bearing macroeco-
nomic significance, then prices of this asset, too, will bear both financially and macro-
economically systemic significance.
This point is perhaps best illustrated by reference to homes and home prices in
the US, which proved during both the 2007–09 crisis and its aftermath to bear both
financial market and direct macroeconomic significance. To start with the former, as
is now well known, securities backed by home mortgage loans became a highly popu-
lar financial asset during the lead-up to 2007.16 Residential mortgage-backed securi-
ties (RMBS) markets came to be second only to the US Treasury market in
capitalization by 2006.17 This seems to have stemmed partly from speculative mania,
partly from favourable regulatory treatment, and partly from outright fraud on the
part of loan-originators and -securitizers alike.18 Whatever the causes, however, the
sheer ubiquity of RMBS as favoured investment vehicles by the early 2000s meant
that home prices, to which RMBS values were of course closely correlated, became
systemically significant to the financial markets. The performance of RMBS prices,
hence the behaviour of RMBS market participants, rode crucially upon them from
2006 onward.19
Housing prices bear not only indirect systemic significance to the financial mar-
kets via their effects upon RMBS markets, but also direct systemic significance to the
macroeconomy via their effects upon consumer behaviour. Here, we allude to the
well-documented ‘wealth effect’ pursuant to which consumer expenditures generally
ride upon consumers’ market-valued net worth.20 Since home prices are by far the
14 See eg L Randall Wray, Understanding Modern Money (1998). Also Minsky’s early articles posthumously
collected by Wray in Hyman Minsky, Ending Poverty: Jobs, Not Welfare (2013).
15 See eg Ron Scherer, ‘US to Tap Strategic Petroleum Reserve to Drive Gas Prices Down’ Christian Science
Monitor (New York, 23 June 2011) <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0623/US-to-tap-Strategic-
Petroleum-Reserve-to-drive-gas-prices-down> accessed 24 February 2016.
16 See eg Gary Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand (2011). Also Robert Hockett, ‘A Fixer-Upper for
Finance’ (2010) 87 Wash U L Rev 1213.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 The specific dynamics, more on which below, inform our recommended regulatory response.
20 See eg Michael Darby, ‘The Wealth Effect’ in The New Palgrave: Dictionary of Economics (1987) 883.
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primary determinant of most Americans’ net worth, and since consumer expenditure
in turn is by far the primary determinant of macroeconomic growth and consequent
wage and employment growth, home prices are primary determinants of the nation’s
macroeconomic performance and consequent wage and employment rates as well.21
Here too we find evidence in recent events, the lengthy recession and tepid recovery
following the troubles of 2007–09 having been widely observed to be consequences
of an ongoing debt-deflation following on housing price drops from mid-2006
onwards.22
Just as credit is far from the sole pervasive input to production, so are housing
and associated RMBS far from the sole pervasively popular investment vehicles.
Other investments to which financial market participants have ‘herded’ in great num-
bers in recent years include (i) collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and the credit
default swaps (CDS) that made RMBS appear safer than they were in the early
2000s, (ii) tech stocks and other corporate equities in the later 1990s, and (iii) so-
called ‘junk bonds’ in the 1980s, to name but a few.23 In most of these cases, as in
that of RMBS, combinations of speculative mania, favourable regulatory treatment,
and outright fraud appear to have played important roles in drawing investors to the
assets in question.24 Aging populations and associated pension fund growth played
their parts too.25 Also as with RMBS, however, in the cases of these assets as well
what matters for present purposes is that there was no herding at all. For where there
is herding, there tend to come systemically significant prices.
Ubiquity of use of the price or index as a benchmark
The third and final characteristic we think lends prices or indices systemic signifi-
cance is their deliberate use as heuristics or ‘benchmarks’ in other pricing decisions.
It is common, for example, for financial actors to set interest rates in credit transac-
tions (including mortgage transactions), as well as the terms of derivative and other
financial contracts, by reference to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)—
ie the rate at which a small coterie of large global banks lend to one another. The lat-
ter accordingly functions in many transactions much as the Fed’s Federal Funds
(Fed Funds) Rate does in other transactions. It is arguably more systemically signifi-
cant even than that rate, however, inasmuch as there are distinct LIBORs for five cur-
rencies, with the number having been even larger until recently.26 Whoever sets
LIBOR as the Fed sets the Fed Funds Rate, then, exercises an influence comparable
to that of the world’s most influential central bank.27
21 ibid. See also Dean Baker, The End of Loser Liberalism: Making Markets Progressive (2011).
22 See eg Paul Krugman, End This Depression Now! (2013); Daniel Alpert, Robert Hockett and Nouriel
Roubini, ‘The Way Forward: Moving from the Post-Bubble, Post-Bust Economy to Renewed Growth
and Competitiveness, New America Foundation’ (2011) <https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/
4272-the-way-forward/NAF--The_Way_Forward--Alpert_Hockett_Roubini.61586bd337b64202a9b0c86
117bdfc98.pdf> accessed 24 February 2016.
23 Gorton (n 16); Hockett (n 16).
24 ibid.
25 Hockett (n 16).
26 See eg Donald McKenzie, ‘What’s in a Number?’ (2008) 30 London Rev Books 11 <http://www.lrb.co.
uk/v30/n18/donald-mackenzie/whats-in-a-number> accessed 24 February 2016.
27 ibid.
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Turning from borrowing rates to other prices, it is also common, for example,
for petroleum prices to be priced relative to the so-called ‘Brent Crude’, ‘West
Texas Intermediate’, or ‘Dubai Crude’ petroleum price benchmarks.28 These for
their part are in most cases determined by small numbers of oil-producing firms
or states much as LIBOR is determined by a small number of large-banking in-
stitutions.29 They then determine in turn the prices asked for other fuel oils by
other actors.30 Other prices—eg those for index fund shares and financial deriva-
tives on the financial markets—are deliberately framed by reference to various
indices commonly watched by financial market participants. Familiar examples in
this case include the aforementioned Consumer Price Index, the Dow Jones
Industrial Averages, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index, and the Case–Shiller
Housing Price Index, to name but a few.31 Finally, yet other important bench-
mark-like prices are those of widely used currencies in relation to one another.
The forex markets too, in other words, ride crucially on relative prices that func-
tion as benchmarks.
The sense in which benchmark prices and indices like these can become systemi-
cally significant when used as described should be clear. These prices are in effect in-
puts to other prices, many such prices, and in this sense are much like inputs to
production itself in their reach. They are pervasively influential.32 The stakes in-
volved in their fluctuations can accordingly be high. Moreover, and as we elaborate
below, the modes by which these prices are determined are particularly vulnerable to
manipulation by, or conflicts of interest among, privileged cliques who can be
tempted by the gains offered by manipulating or trading on such pervasively influen-
tial determinants of prices across many markets. This is surely one reason that some
of these benchmarks—the Fed Funds Rate, for example—are publicly determined.
But it is also a reason to subject them to enhanced regulatory scrutiny when they are
not. Recent scandals involving LIBOR, EURIBOR, and foreign exchange markets—
the latter itself also ‘made’ by a small number of institutions—in particular demon-
strate the consequences of not doing so.33
28 See eg ‘Oil Markets Explained’ BBC News (18 October 2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
904748.stm> accessed 24 February 2016.
29 ibid.
30 ibid.
31 See n 8, for reminder on Case–Shiller and CPI. For more on the Dow Jones and S&P 500, See eg N
Amenc and others, Assessing the Quality of Stock Market Indices (2006).
32 For a thoughtful discussion of the economics of benchmarks, see Darrell Duffie & Jeremy C. Stein,
Reforming LIBOR and Other Financial Market Benchmarks, 29 J. Econ. Persp. 191, 193–196 (2015).
Duffie and Stein highlight important information-related benefits that benchmarking offers. These include
lower search costs, better matching, and greater participation in markets even by less well informed
agents. Once a benchmark is established, it can become a powerful ‘basin of attraction’ for related trades,
thereby increasing trading volume and improving liquidity. Id. at 195–96.
33 See eg Hayley Richardson, ‘HSBC Embroiled in New Price-Fixing Scandal’ Newsweek (24 February 2015)
<http://europe.newsweek.com/hsbc-embroiled-new-price-fixing-scandal-309156?rx¼us> accessed 24
February 2016; Terrence McCoy, ‘Yessssss: The Brazen Messages Among Bankers that Produced a $4.3
Million Fine’ Washington Post (13 November 2014) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/
wp/2014/11/13/the-gleeful-messages-exchanged-by-bankers-that-produced-a-4-3-billion-fine/> accessed 24
February 2016; Jonathan Berr, ‘Banks Pay Fines, but Show Little Sign of Reform’ CBS MoneyWatch (12
November 2014) <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/banks-pay-fines-but-show-little-sign-of-reform/>
accessed 24 February 2016.
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SYSTEMIC VULNERABILITIES
The criteria elaborated above for determining whether particular prices or indices are
systemically important amount to reasons for caring, as a polity, about these prices
or indices. They are characteristics that lend these prices or indices policy salience.
When it comes to determining how to react to that salience, however, one must first
understand the particular vulnerabilities to which the prices or indices in question,
and hence the markets to which they are systemically important, are subject. In other
words, the criteria elaborated above in the section ‘Designation Criteria’ tell us the
sense in which prices or indices can be systemically important, while what remains to
be elaborated is precisely how these prices or indices can render our markets system-
ically vulnerable.34
A useful way to address this second question is to concentrate on the mechanisms
through which systemically significant prices and indices are generated or deter-
mined. For it is from these mechanisms that the particular vulnerabilities, which
these prices and indices can transmit to broader markets, originate. We will address
these mechanisms and the vulnerabilities to which they give rise by reference to par-
ticular (i) information differentials and associated conflicts of interest, (ii) market
power differentials and associated manipulation dangers, and (iii) recursive collective
action problems that characterize some such mechanisms. The first two characteris-
tics make it possible for prevailing prices to differ from ‘natural’ long-term equilib-
rium prices. The third makes it possible for there to be no stable equilibrium price at
all.
Information differentials and conflicts of interest
As noted above, many SIPIs are determined by comparatively small numbers of persons
or firms that are themselves actors in markets in which the SIPIs are systemically influ-
ential. An obvious case in point is the aforementioned LIBOR, the US Dollar rendition
of which is determined by 18 large, globally active banking concerns.35 An institution
that plays a significant role in setting LIBOR on the one hand, while taking positions in
multiple markets in which other prices are determined by LIBOR on the other hand,
clearly is on more than an equal footing with other actors in those other markets. Its in-
formational advantage is profound and pervasive, and likely over time to produce prices
in multiple products that vary from ‘natural’, long-term equilibrium prices of the kind
that we usually depend upon multiple arms-length transactions to produce.
Consider, for example, a derivative transaction through which a financial institu-
tion seeks to hedge against future changes in prevailing interest rates within a partic-
ular economy. Assume that this institution is not a member of the ‘club’ that sets
LIBOR, while most institutions willing to enter into the contemplated derivative
transaction are members of that club. Since the parties to a derivative contract are in
34 It should be noted that we say ‘vulnerable’ rather than ‘risky’ here. The reason is that we believe vulnera-
bility to be a more capacious category than risk, with the latter constituting one, but only one, form of
the former. We believe that we should care as a polity about all forms of vulnerability to which systemi-
cally important prices subject our markets. We worry, however, that occurrence of the word ‘systemically’
in our phrase ‘systemically important prices’ might mislead some into thinking our only concern is ‘sys-
temic risk’. As will be clear in what follows, it is not.
35 McKenzie (n 26).
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most cases effectively taking opposed sides of a ‘bet’—in this case, a bet on the future
course of interest rates—the non-LIBOR-setting institution in the contemplated
transaction is effectively betting against ‘the house’ on a prospect about which the
house has much more information. Moreover, the same would be true were ‘the
house’ to help set currency exchange rates on the one hand, while ‘betting’ on values
derived from those rates on the other.36
This asymmetry can yield any combination of three possible consequences. One
is that non-club-member institutions, aware of their disadvantages relative to club-
members, engage in fewer transactions of the contemplated type. Another is that
such institutions do enter into such transactions, but on terms that do not produce
fair equilibrium prices of the kind that arms-length transactions among equals are ex-
pected to produce.37 Finally, another is that such institutions, aware of the ‘rigged
game’ nature of the markets, react in destabilizingly dramatic fashion when suspi-
cions rooted in that awareness appear to be confirmed by particular transactions in
which ‘club’ institutions engage.38
In any of these three cases, the relevant market falls prey to a systemic harm. It is
incomplete, unfairly functioning, prone to volatility, or some combination of these.39
One consequence is that the price system as operative within the relevant market is
not reflecting underlying value or, therefore, facilitating our markets’ allocative effi-
ciency.40 Another is that the price system as operative in the relevant market is oper-
ating as an instrument of injustice.41 And finally another is that the price system as
operative in the relevant market can operate as a mediator of volatility and conse-
quent macroeconomic instability.
Market power differentials and manipulation dangers
The same harms just described can result not only from advantaged parties’ having
better knowledge of future changes in particular market values, but also from their
having greater capacity to determine such changes—the capacity conventionally re-
ferred to as ‘market power.’42 Consider the LIBOR hypothetical just contemplated,
for example. In this transaction the non-LIBOR-setting institution might effectively
36 Scandal emerged along precisely such lines in the spring of 2015. See n 33. See also Kate Gibson, ‘In
Rare Admission of Guilt, Wall Street Banks Say They Rigged Markets’ CBS MoneyWatch (20 May 2015)
<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/in-rare-admission-of-guilt-wall-st-banks-admit-they-rigged-markets/>
accessed 24 February 2016; Jane Onyanga-Omara and Kevin McCoy, ‘Banks Fined $4.3 Billion in
Foreign Exchange Probe’ USA Today (12 November 2014) <http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
business/2014/11/12/forex-investigation-settlements-announced/18885767/> accessed 24 February
2016.
37 See Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova, ‘“Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments as Market Actors’
(2014) 15 Theor Inq L 53.
38 The ‘crony capitalism’ diagnosis of the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s appeals to this dynamic.
See eg Helen Hughes, ‘Crony Capitalism and the East Asian Currency Financial “Crises,”’ (Spring 1999)
Policy, 1. See also Michael Pettis, The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of Financial
Collapse (2001).
39 Hockett and Omarova (n 37). Note also, in the spirit of n 34, that the list of such systemic harms includes
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be betting against the LIBOR-setting ‘house’ on a prospect not only about which the
house simply has more information, but also which the house is able, in collusion
with others, actually to set.43
The degree of such market power enjoyed by ‘the house’ in any given case will of
course ride on the number of ‘club’ members and the cohesiveness of their collu-
sion.44 But the potential is nevertheless ever-present where systemically significant
prices are set by small coalitions of private actors—or, a fortiori, by individual parties
acting alone.45 Insofar as this danger is present, the market in question is subject to
the same forms of systemic vulnerability as those beset by the differential informa-
tion problem discussed just above.
In short, then, once again we face the prospect of any combination of three
possible upshots. One is that non-club-member institutions, aware of their disad-
vantages relative to market-power-wielding club-members, engage in fewer transac-
tions of the contemplated type. Another is that such institutions do enter into
such transactions, but on terms that do not produce fair equilibrium prices of the
kind that arms-length transactions among equals are expected to produce. And a
third is that non-club-member institutions, aware of the ‘rigged game’ nature of
the markets, react in destabilizingly dramatic fashion when suspicions rooted in
that awareness appear to be confirmed by particular transactions in which the
‘club’ institutions engage.
In any of these three cases, again the relevant market is falling prey to a systemic
harm. It is incomplete, unfairly functioning, prone to volatility, or some combination
of these.46 One consequence again is accordingly that the price system as operative
within the relevant market is not reflecting underlying value or, therefore, facilitating
our markets’ allocative efficiency. Another is that the price system as operative in the
relevant market is operating as an instrument of injustice—now not merely inciden-
tal injustice, but intentional injustice done by colluders or manipulators.47 And,
43 As Duffie and Stein persuasively argue, for example, the fact that the individual LIBOR-setting banks
were also major derivatives dealers underwrote a particularly pernicious structural incentive for LIBOR
manipulation. Given the sheer size of derivatives trades indexed to the LIBOR, even a small movement in
the benchmark rate could translate into enormous derivatives gains for the club-member banks able to
effect such movements. In effect, large dealer-banks were able to ‘lever’ their ability to influence LIBOR
(i.e., their ‘club membership’) to gain significant illicit advantage in related derivatives markets. See,
Duffie & Stein, supra note 32, at 200.
44 See, generally, William J Baumol and others, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure
(1982).
45 This form of abuse was at work in the LIBOR scandal, more on which below, as well as in other ‘BOR’
scandals, notably EURIBOR. See n 33. See also Hayley Richardson, ‘UK’s Serious Fraud Office Grills
Traders Over Europe-Wide Rate Fixing Scandal’ Newsweek (9 March 2015) <http://europe.newsweek.
com/uks-serious-fraud-office-grills-traders-over-europe-wide-rate-fixing-scandal-312369> accessed 24
February 2016. The same is true of recent precious metal price-fixing scandals. See eg Jean Eaglesham
and Christopher Matthews, ‘Big Banks Face Scrutiny over Pricing of Metals’ Wall Street Journal (23
February 2015) <http://europe.newsweek.com/uks-serious-fraud-office-grills-traders-over-europe-wide-
rate-fixing-scandal-312369> accessed 24 February 2016.
46 See n 34, 37, 38.
47 ibid. For thorough consideration of the dangers posed by benchmark manipulation in particular, see
Duffie and Stein, supra, note 32; also Andrew Verstein, ‘Benchmark Manipulation’ (2015) 56 Bos Col L
Rev 215.
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finally, another is that the price system as operative in the relevant market can oper-
ate as a mediator of volatility and consequent macroeconomic instability.
Recursive collective action problems
Ironically, just as the concentrated market power or informational advantage enjoyed
by some private setters of SIPIs can produce systemic vulnerabilities, so can the lack
of any such institution or coalition of such institutions in some cases. Here we allude
to the recursive collective action challenges to which many decentralized markets, es-
pecially financial and money markets, seem to be vulnerable.48
The hallmark of a collective action problem, of course, is its aggregating multiple
individually rational decisions into collectively irrational or calamitous outcomes.49
Recursive problems are those in which the problematic outcome in question
prompts a new round of decisions of the same type as produced the collectively
problematic outcome at the outset, thereby producing a yet worse outcome, with
more iterations following to the point of comprehensive catastrophe.50 Consumer
price hyperinflations, debt deflations, bums’ rushes and arms races are classic cases.
So are asset price bubbles, bank runs, and asset ‘fire sales.’51
The case of the asset fire sale is particularly salient where SIPI-mediated systemic
market fragilities are concerned. Consider the earlier-mentioned RMBS market, for
example. As noted before, RMBS prices fall squarely within the definition of ‘SIPI’ as
we have elaborated it. Yet, RMBS also were subject—dramatically subject—to a par-
ticularly poignant recursive collective action problem (‘ReCAP’) in months culminat-
ing in 2009.52
When it became clear in 2007–08 that some RMBS were backed in significant
measure by troubled ‘subprime’ mortgage loans and accordingly ‘toxic’, holders of
these securities were faced with a quandary: while there was reasonably reliable
knowledge in the markets that a specific percentage of all RMBS outstanding were
‘toxic’, nobody knew precisely which RMBS were the toxic ones.53 Under such cir-
cumstances it was rational for prudent investors to ‘bet cautiously’ and assume that
they held disproportionate shares of the toxic RMBS. Everyone thinking this way,
however, of course meant that investors in aggregate were undervaluing the market
portfolio; they were effectively acting ‘as if’ the aggregate portion of toxic RMBS was
much larger than they all knew it to be.54 When they acted accordingly and sold si-
multaneously, they of course drove down the prices of RMBS further, which of
course triggered more rounds of mass selling, further price drops, and so on—a clas-
sic ‘run’ on the asset in question.55
Because the assets in question were RMBS, however, and because RMBS prices,
as noted above, had become systemically significant by the early 2000s, the behaviour




52 Hockett and Omarova (n 37).
53 ibid.
54 ibid.
55 ibid. See also Hockett (n 48).
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just recounted was no ordinary fire sale. It was a systemically catastrophic fire sale. It
massively destroyed value in countless portfolios, including retirement portfolios, on
which millions were reliant.56 It also drove housing prices—which we noted above
also to be systemically significant—yet lower by raising the cost of mortgage and refi-
nance credit and thereby constricting housing demand and raising foreclosure
rates.57 And finally, of course, it caused massive losses among those who had effec-
tively ‘bet’ on RMBS performance, housing prices, or both via CDOs, CDS, and
other derivative instruments.58
None of this would have had to happen, at least not with the magnitude that it
did, had some collective agent been able to act to ensure that the aggregate value of
RMBS outstanding more closely reflected the ‘toxicity’ of the market portfolio of
RMBS.59 This is in part what the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Programme
(TARP) and the Fed’s Maiden Lane Funds were meant to assist with, though clarity
about the mission and hence effectiveness in the execution at first left much to be de-
sired.60 Happily, Maiden Lane in particular and, later, QE3 have done much better
than TARP at first did, in the comparative tranquility of the post-crisis years.
In any event, the message for present purposes is clear enough: the absence of
concentrated informational advantage or market power can be as problematic as the
presence of either where the transmission of systemic vulnerability to financial and
broader markets via SIPIs is concerned. What, then, to do? The answer, we think, is
to opt in favour of concentrated informational advantage and market power, but to
ensure that the advantage and power in question are held or controlled by public, as
distinguished from private, actors. This of course takes us to policy responses to
SIPI-mediated systemic vulnerability.
ENHANCED REGULATION
As noted earlier, the Dodd–Frank regime put in place in the US following the 2007–
09 troubles treats so-called SIFIs and systemically important market utilities as ‘spe-
cial’ in view of their systemic importance, and accordingly subjects them to enhance
prudential regulatory standards. We believe that an analogous strategy would make
for an intuitively tractable, politically feasible, and regulatorily practicable first step in
addressing the vulnerabilities to which SIPIs give rise.
Like the Dodd–Frank regime, then, we would recommend first vesting authority
in a regulatory body or small group of such bodies to designate particular prices and
indices as SIPIs, then vesting authority in one or more regulatory bodies to develop
enhanced prudential regulatory standards to which the derivation and maintenance
of designated SIPIs will be subject. We discuss our proposed regime in that order, in
each case discussing both prospective SIPIs over which the US has primary jurisdic-
tion, and prospective SIPIs over which other nations or transnational regulatory bod-
ies have primary or concurrent jurisdiction.
56 ibid.
57 ibid.
58 Gorton (n 16).
59 Hockett and Omarova (n 37).
60 ibid.
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SIPI designation
The first task in developing a regime able to handle SIPI-associated market vulner-
abilities is to determine who decides whether a particular price or index warrants
SIPI status, and pursuant to what criteria. We have in effect already addressed the lat-
ter, ‘what’ question in the section ‘Designation Criteria’, so will concentrate here on
the ‘who’ question.
Beginning with the domestic case, where the price or index in question is subject to
primary US jurisdiction, the FSOC would seem the natural body to discharge this task.
It is, after all, the body in which Dodd–Frank vests SIFI-designation authority, pre-
cisely because it is the body that has responsibility for overseeing the US financial sys-
tem as a whole—ie as a comprehensive and integrated system.61 As for the standards
to be employed by the FSOC in making these determinations, again, we think those
elaborated above in the section ‘Designation Criteria’ are well suited to the task. This
is both for the reasons stated there and because, as noted before, these standards reso-
nate closely with those laid out in Title I of Dodd–Frank itself in affording guidance to
the FSOC on the subject.
Where prospective SIPIs are not subject to primary US jurisdiction, we recom-
mend that counterparts to FSOC make counterpart designation decisions, again on
the basis of criteria reminiscent of those elaborated above in the section ‘Designation
Criteria’. For a price or index over which the UK has primary jurisdiction, for exam-
ple, probably the FCA, acting in consultation with the Bank of England (BoE) would
be the appropriate designator. In the EU, the appropriate body is the European
Commission, responsible for the EU’s new benchmark-regulatory reform developed
in response to 2012’s LIBOR-related scandal.62 For a price or index over which mul-
tiple nations’ authorities have jurisdiction, on the other hand, it would seem to make
sense for the FSB to do the designating; it is, after all, the closest global analog there
is to the US FSOC.63
In these transnational cases the process of SIPI designation should resemble the
process of transnational capital-regulatory convergence as pursued via the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS): the world’s primary systemic financial
regulators would first agree on particular SIPI designations, then implement these
decisions through rulemakings or counterpart regulatory actions back home.64 We
are uncertain whether there are too many procedural or substantive disagreements
across jurisdictions for such a process to be practicable; but we doubt it, and in any
event there is no way to find out with reasonable certainty whether such challenges
confront us until we commence with the effort.
In the worst case scenario of non-agreement, moreover, there seems no reason to
suppose that any particular jurisdiction—certainly the US—could not at least ad-
dress domestically those risks that any prospective SIPI might raise in its own
61 Dodd–Frank Act (n 4), Title I.
62 See n 32.
63 See Financial Stability Board, ‘About the FSB’ <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/>
accessed 24 February 2016.
64 See Bank for International Settlements, ‘About BIS’ <https://www.bis.org/about/index.htm> accessed
24 February 2016.
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markets. All it would need to do is make its own SIPI determinations, then subject
designated SIPIs to substantive standards like those to which we now turn.
Substantive SIPI-regulatory standards
The second task in developing a regime able to handle SIPI-associated market vul-
nerabilities is to develop substantive regulatory standards to which SIPIs, once desig-
nated as such, will be held subject. This task, like the designation task, likewise
implicates both ‘who’ and ‘what’ questions, neither of which we have yet addressed.
We, accordingly, address both here in that order.
Who
Where the ‘who’-related question is concerned, we must once again confront varia-
tion rooted in jurisdictional differences with respect to various prospective SIPIs. If
the price or index in question is subject to primary US jurisdiction, the Fed, acting in
collaboration with appropriate ‘functional’ regulators in some cases, would seem the
natural ‘who’ to discharge the substantive regulatory task. The Fed is, after all, the
body in which Title I of Dodd–Frank vests SIFI-regulatory authority, even while di-
recting the Fed to act in consultation with functional regulators where non-banks re-
ceive SIFI designations.65 There seems no reason not to follow the same pattern
with respect to SIPI regulation.
Were the Case–Shiller Housing Price Index to be designated a SIPI, for example,
it would seem to make sense to charge the Fed, the Federal Housing Agency (FHA),
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) with the task of developing en-
hanced regulatory standards to which this index’s construction and use would be sub-
ject. Were the West Texas Intermediate Crude oil benchmark to be designated a
SIPI, on the other hand, or were the price of a widely traded petroleum price deriva-
tive to be likewise designated, it would seem sensible to charge the Fed, the CFTC,
and the FERC with the task.
Where prospective SIPIs are not subject to primary US jurisdiction, counterparts
to the Fed and the US functional regulators should probably develop the enhanced
regulatory standards. For a price or index over which the UK has primary jurisdic-
tion, for example, presumably the BoE and FCA would be the appropriate standards
developers. For a price or index over which multiple nations’ authorities have juris-
diction, on the other hand, it would seem to make sense for the BCBS (including as
it does the world’s central bank chairs and finance ministers) and the appropriate
transnational functional regulatory forum (eg the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO)) to do the standard developing. It is worth once
again noting in this connection that the European Commission has developed a
comprehensive new EU-wide benchmark regulatory framework, while other jurisdic-
tions are working quickly to follow suit.66
65 Dodd–Frank Act (n 4), Title I.
66 See n 32, and accompanying text. Verstein (n 47) thinks the EU approach to regulating against bench-
mark fraud wrongheaded, particularly in its approaches to mandatory disclosure and governance. Because
our purpose in this article is to develop a general framework for understanding and regulating all forms of
systemically important prices or indices, we take no position here on the detailed substance of the EU’s
new approach to regulating against benchmark fraud.
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Generally, in cases requiring transnational cooperation, again we think the process
would best start by emulating that pursuant to which the BCBS itself facilitates trans-
national capital-regulatory convergence. National regulators would first seek agree-
ment upon substantive regulatory standards, then implement those standards back
home through rulemakings or counterpart regulatory actions.
What
Turning from who will develop enhanced SIPI-regulatory standards to what the con-
tent of such standards should be, as noted above we believe that one or more of five
regulatory strategies will prove helpful for most purposes. We elaborate these strate-
gies, also as noted above, by reference to the particular vulnerabilities to which the
processes of particular SIPIs’ generation or determination are subject.
Enhanced oversight. The first regulatory option, which we think well advised for all
SIPIs, is enhanced oversight. The idea here is for the appropriate regulator or regula-
tors, as determined according to criteria elaborated immediately above in the subsec-
tion ‘Ubiquity of the Underlying Value as a Productive Input’, simply to supervise
the construction and/or administration of the SIPI in question. They would attend
in particular both to how the SIPI is being generated or determined, and to how it is
being used. In so doing, they would be on the lookout for evidence either that pri-
vate parties who jointly or severally generate or determine the SIPI in question are
systematically using informational advantages or market power in transactions with
others, or that rapid movements in the SIPI in question are attributable to recursive
collective action challenges—ie are bubble- or bust-related. The regulators must also,
of course, have all information-gathering authority, including subpoena power that
might be necessary in adequately discharging the enhanced oversight function. The
UK has responded to the LIBOR scandals of 2012 with a strategy of this general
kind.67
Licensure/pre-approval. The second regulatory option, responsive to informational
advantage, conflicted interest, and associated manipulation or collusion opportuni-
ties, is to require licensure or pre-approval of private institutions that establish or
maintain widely used benchmarks which receive SIPI designation.68 The basic idea
here is to ensure that those who develop, provide, or maintain benchmark indices
not employ their roles vis-a-vis these indices to extract rents from others who lack
such roles.69
Requiring licensure can be helpful in realizing this desideratum in several
ways. First, it puts parties on notice that the privileged role that they play with re-
spect to their indices both carries special responsibilities and is contingent on their
fulfilling these responsibilities. The situation here is reminiscent of that faced by
67 Main (n 32).
68 The EU benchmark-regulation initiative employs a strategy of this kind. See n 32.
69 For an early proposal of such a regime for the preapproval of complex financial products, see Saule T
Omarova, ‘License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products’ (2012) 90 Wash U L
Rev 63.
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‘market-making’ US broker-dealers (‘B-Ds’) on the securities markets, who in their
market-making capacities are held to higher standards of disclosure and fair dealing
than broker-dealers acting in their more ordinary capacities.
Secondly, requiring licensure offers a means of screening likely malefactors out of
SIPI-determining roles before they take them on. A person or institution with a poor
track record of regulatory compliance in one or more markets, for example, can be
disqualified in advance, under a licensing regime, from taking part in the determina-
tion of prices or indices that are designated as SIPIs.
Finally and relatedly, a licensing regime offers the opportunity of regularly re-ex-
amining those who determine designated SIPIs, with a view to their ongoing habits
of compliance—at least if the license has to be regularly renewed. A useful model
here might be the B-D registration regime, pursuant to which B-Ds must take regular
examinations, at gradually lengthening intervals, for a period of years before finally
being rebuttably presumed to be above-board. Operating in this way, the appropriate
SIPI regulator will be regularly overseeing those who determine SIPIs even as it con-
tinually oversees movements in the particular SIPI itself.
Utility-style regulation. The third regulatory option, again responsive to informational
advantage, conflicted interest, and associated manipulation or collusion opportuni-
ties, as well as to market power, is to develop a regime of enhanced utility-style regu-
lation—including in some cases participation by regulators in the very ‘clubs’ or
coalitions that aggregate and publish ‘benchmark’ prices or indices. Here the idea is
to recognize forthrightly that the development and maintenance of some SIPIs might
be in the nature of a ‘natural monopoly’ function, at least if (i) scale economies or
network effects render concentration in some industries structurally likely, while (ii)
consequently large firms in those industries then come naturally to wield dispropor-
tionate influence on prices simply by acting, as ‘big’ actors, in markets that generate
those prices.70
There is reason to think, for example, that certain kinds of insurance might give
rise to natural monopolies or, at any rate, oligopolies within associated insurance
markets.71 If that is so, and were insurance companies in such markets to develop
and maintain some price index or benchmark that came to function as a SIPI, then it
would stand to reason that the maintenance of that index or benchmark itself was ef-
fectively a monopoly or oligopoly function. Were that to be the case, in turn, then
one time-honoured regulatory response would be in effect partly to ‘socialize’ the
firm or firms in question, rather as we do with natural monopolies in many markets
now suggestively labelled ‘public utilities’ markets.72
Utility regulation of this kind takes several forms, most involving some form of di-
rect rate regulation.73 In some cases, public officials sit on the boards of otherwise
privately owned utilities firms.74 In other cases, the firms’ boards are private, but
must seek permission to raise rates from plenary ‘public utilities boards’ that review
70 See Hockett and Omarova (n 37) for more on this prospect.
71 See eg Robert Hockett, ‘Making (Some) Sense of the Health Care Reform Debate’ (2010) 53 Challenge 28.
72 ibid.
73 See eg Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (1960).
74 ibid.
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all such requests made by all designated utilities firms.75 We suggest that options
analogous to these would likewise be possible where SIPI determination is
concerned.
One model would be for a ‘SIPI Rates Board’ to be authorized to oversee all
SIPIs determined by naturally monopolistic or oligopolistic firms and require, any
time that a movement in a SIPI did not appear readily explicable by reference to
competitive market behaviour, that the firm or ‘club’ responsible for the SIPI in ques-
tion explain the movement. Lack of an explanation might then be treated as grounds
for a more intrusive inquest or regulatory sanction of one kind or another. Another
possible model would be for an appropriate regulator to participate in the very coali-
tion or ‘club’ of persons who set benchmarks or derive indices that come to be desig-
nated as SIPIs in the first place. Such a regime would bear obvious similarities to
‘golden share’ mechanisms pursuant to which public officials sit on the boards of cer-
tain systemically significant or otherwise politically salient business firms, forthrightly
representing the public interest thereon.76
There are, again, many possibilities here—too many to vet comprehensively in
this article. We think the process of thinking-up and thinking-through such possibili-
ties, however, worth commencing at once.
Enhanced antitrust and anti-fraud regulation. The fourth option we envisage, now re-
sponsive more particularly to market power and potential collusion, is enhanced anti-
trust and anti-fraud regulation. The idea in this case is simple and familiar. If a
particular price or index that has been designated a SIPI is employed or manipulated
in a rent-seeking manner by any institution or institutions with market power in rela-
tion to that SIPI, this would presumptively constitute a straightforward violation of
the norms that our antitrust and anti-fraud regimes are meant to vindicate. It would
also seem to constitute a straightforward violation of the anti-fraud norms that find
expression in various parts of the bank-, securities-, and other finance-regulatory
laws. In all such cases, moreover, the stakes and likely consequences of such viola-
tions are particularly dramatic, in virtue of the very features that render the prices or
indices in question ‘systemically important’.
It would seem to make sense, then, either or both (i) to establish an office within
the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ)—and any counterpart
non-US regulator—tasked specifically with monitoring possible anticompetitive
behaviour with respect to SIPIs, and (ii) to develop enhanced penalties for fraudu-
lent or manipulative practices with respect to SIPIs.77 This strategy would not only
bring regulatory and criminal law enforcement regimes into sync with the special vul-
nerabilities and high stakes associated with SIPIs, but also offers the advantage of
75 ibid.
76 See eg Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova, ‘Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental
Finance State’ (2015, forthcoming) 93 Wash U L Rev.
77 Verstein (n 47) helpfully suggests that narrow pleading standards of the kind generally associated with
conventional fraud are unreasonable where benchmark fraud is concerned, and that a somewhat more re-
laxed standard, particularly in respect of the misrepresentation and reliance elements of the offense, might
be in order in view of the ways benchmarks operate. A change of this sort would be consistent with what
we are calling ‘enhanced’ anti-fraud protection.
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incrementalism: it is a straightforward ‘tweaking’ of regimes that have long been in
place.
A related strategy, operating from the front-end, would be to mandate the use of
larger sample sets in constructing an index or benchmark.78 In effect, this would
amount to broadening the size of the anticompetitive ‘club’ whose oligopolistic mar-
ket power occasions the dangers we face in the first place. This strategy would also,
in virtue of its ex ante character, be cross-cutting inasmuch as it could be made part
of a licensure or utility-style regime, as discussed just above, as readily as part of an
antitrust-style regime.
Extended OMOs. The fifth and final regulatory option we think worth considering is
this one responsive to the recursive collective action problems that beset some
decentralized markets in which SIPIs are operative, is price maintenance—typically
within some band—through OMOs. The idea here is to take seriously one of the
many lessons thrown up by the experience of 2007–09. This is the lesson that in
some cases, market decentralization itself can work systematically disastrous effects
via the medium of some systemically significant price like that of RMBS. As noted
above, RMBS were systematically undervalued by markets during the panic, such
that only a ‘large’ actor capable of in effect ‘buying the market’ or a significant por-
tion thereof would have been able to keep prices in line with less panic-wrought, lon-
ger term mean values. Any private actor that large, however, would have possessed
‘market power’ with which few would be comfortable, at least were that private actor
to be pursuing a private agenda.79
The obvious solution in such case is to empower a large public actor pursuing a
public agenda. This is effectively the form of response to which the US groped via
the TARP and Maiden Lane programmes mentioned above, as well as via QE3 as an-
nounced by the Fed in the autumn of 2012.80 It is also, more permanently, the way
in which the US handles systemically important interest rates in Fed OMOs, and in
some circumstances the way in which it handles price spikes in petroleum markets
via the SPR.81
A final regulatory option we might wish to consider with respect to at least some
SIPIs, then, is OMOs in markets additional to money rental, RMBS, and petroleum.
This is an option we have countenanced elsewhere under the rubrics of ‘Open Labor
Market Operations’, ‘Open Commodity Market Operations’, and, more generally
‘OMO Plus’.82 The idea here would be for the Fed or its counterparts in other juris-
dictions, perhaps in conjunction with other, functional regulators depending on the
particular SIPI in question, to buy and sell in markets additional to sovereign debt
with a view to keeping particular SIPIs within particular bands thought necessary for
the purposes of maintaining systemic stability.83
78 This approach is recommended, eg by Duffie and Stein (n 47), as well as by the FSB (n 6).
79 Hockett and Omarova (n 37).
80 ibid.
81 ibid.
82 Hockett and Omarova (n 76).
83 ibid.
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Various candidate SIPIs here come to mind. The S&P 500 or Wilshire 5000 mar-
ket indices constitute one class of candidates, in view of their relation to the perfor-
mance of the securities markets (and consequent ‘wealth effects’ economy-wide) as a
whole. Certain sensitive commodity prices—those for widely used fuels, foodstuffs,
and some other raw materials, for example—constitute another class of candidates.
Finally, wage or salary indices constitute yet another class of candidates. In all of
these cases, there is at least some reason—most such reasons sounding in (i) the
same factors as render the indices here SIPIs in the first place, and (ii) the associated
markets’ vulnerability to recursive collective action problems—for the public qua
public to play a role in price stability maintenance. As we have written elsewhere, in
some cases—eg commodities—it is relatively easy to design OMO-analogues for the
markets in question.84 In other cases—eg wages or salaries—it is more compli-
cated.85 We leave these matters to our earlier work for present purposes.
Either way, it seems to us that the time has come to recognize that there are more
SIPIs than interest rates alone, and that there are more possible renditions of OMO
than that now conducted by the Fed in relation to those rates alone. The only real
question is where we should do best to consider extending current OMO practice,
and the circumstances under which we might wish to do so.
CONCLUSION
We have had to cover a fair bit of territory in this article, hence have done so in a
necessarily preliminary way in view of space constraints. We think the inquiry well-
defined and contained, however, and well worth more fully developed pursuit. The
reasons for deeming some financial institutions and market utilities ‘systemically im-
portant’, we think, are both compelling and now widely recognized. The Dodd–
Frank Act in the US accordingly did well to recognize this new category of institu-
tion and market utility in the wake of the crisis of 2007–09, and also did reasonably
well in developing a specific regime able both to identify and designate, and then spe-
cially to regulate, such institutions and utilities in current markets.
The same considerations as warrant identification and enhanced regulation of so-
called ‘SIFIs’, however, seem to us also to warrant identification and enhanced regu-
lation of what we here have dubbed ‘SIPIs’. Such prices and indices are at least as
pervasively influential on financial market performance and macroeconomic conse-
quence as are SIFIs, and can be readily identified by reference to similar criteria.
They also lend themselves, we have argued, to similar—or at any rate already
familiar—forms of enhanced regulation, as recent EU and other jurisdictions’ efforts
at least with respect to benchmarks post-LIBOR suggest others appreciate. Given all
of this, it seems well worth the effort to commence a serious scholarly and regulatory
dialogue on what now to do about SIPIs more comprehensively. This article is sim-
ply an opening gambit in what we anticipate will be a lengthy and lively discussion.
84 ibid.
85 ibid.
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